Mitigating Denial Of Services Using Secure Overlay Service Model by Mool, Madhulika et al.
                     International Journal of Engineering Trends and Technology (IJETT) – Volume 8 Number 9- Feb  2014 
 
           ISSN: 2231-5381                    http://www.ijettjournal.org                               Page 479 
 
Mitigating Denial-of-Service Attacks Using Secure 
Service Overlay Model 
 
Shalaka S. Chowriwar #1,Madhulika S. Mool#2,Prajyoti P.Sabale#3,Sneha S.Parpelli#4,Mr.Nilesh Sambhe #5 
 
#Department of Computer Technology,Yeshwantrao Chavan College Of  Engineering ,  Nagpur ,India. 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Denial of service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks 
continue to threaten the reliability of networking systems. Previous 
approaches for protecting networks from DoS attacks are reactive in that they 
wait for an attack to be launched before taking appropriate measures to 
protect the network. This leaves the door open for other attacks that use more 
sophisticated methods to mask their traffic. A secure overlay services (SOS) 
architecture has been proposed to provide reliable communication between 
clients and a target under DoS attacks. The SOS architecture employs a set of 
overlay nodes arranged in three hierarchical layers that controls access to 
the target. We propose an architecture called secure overlay services (SOS) 
that proactively prevents denial of service (DoS) attacks, which works toward 
supporting emergency services, or similar types of communication. The 
architecture uses a combination of secure overlay tunneling, routing via 
consistent hashing, and filtering. We reduce the probability of successful 
attacks by: 1) performing intensive filtering near protected network edges, 
pushing the attack point into the core of the network, where high-speed 
routers can handle the volume of attack traffic and 2) introducing 
randomness and anonymity into the forwarding architecture, making it 
difficult for an attacker to target nodes along the path to a specific SOS-
protected destination. Using simple analytical models, we evaluate the 
likelihood that an attacker can successfully launch a DoS attack against an 
SOS protected network. Our analysis demonstrates that such an architecture 
reduces the likelihood of a successful attack to minuscule levels.  
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I.INTRODUCTION 
A secure system meets or exceeds an application-specified set of security 
policy requirements. For example, in message delivery, the high-level 
requirements may be that the correct information gets to the right person, in 
the right place, at the right time. The details of “right” are determined by the 
application’s needs. One threat to timely data delivery in a public network 
such as the Internet is denial of service (DoS) attacks: these attacks 
overwhelm the processing or link capacity of the target site (or routers that are 
topologically close) by saturating it (them) with bogus packets. Such attacks 
can disrupt legitimate communications at minimal cost and danger to the 
attacker, as has been demonstrated repeatedly in recent years.In the SOS 
architecture, we address the problem of securing communication in today’s 
existing Internet protocol (IP) infrastructure from denial of service (DoS) 
attacks, where the communication is between a predetermined location and a 
set of well-known users, located anywhere in the wide-area network, who 
have authorization to communicate with that location. We focus our efforts on 
protecting a site that stores information that is difficult to replicate due to 
security concerns or due to its dynamic nature. An example is a database that 
maintains timely or confidential information such as building structure 
reports, intelligence, assignment updates, or strategic information. We assume 
that there is a predetermined set of clients scattered throughout the network 
who require access to this information, from anywhere in the network.  The 
portion of the network immediately surrounding the target (location to be 
protected) aggressively filters and blocks all incoming packets whose source 
addresses are not “approved.” The small set of source addresses (potentially 
as small as 2–3 addresses) that are “approved” at any particular time is kept 
secret so that attackers cannot use them to pass through the filter. These 
addresses are picked from among those within a distributed set of nodes 
throughout the wide area network, that form a secure overlay: any 
transmissions that wish to traverse the overlay must first be validated at entry 
points of the overlay[7]. Once inside the overlay, the traffic is tunneled 
securely for several hops along the overlay to the “approved” (and secret from 
attackers) locations, which can then forward the validated traffic through the 
filtering routers to the target. The two main principles behind our design are: 
1) elimination of communication points, which constitute attractive DoS 
targets, via a combination of filtering and overlay routing to obscure the 
identities of the sites whose traffic is permitted to pass through the filter and 
2) the ability to recover from random or induced failures within the 
forwarding infrastructure or within the secure overlay nodes. The attackers 
can also know the IP addresses of the nodes that participate in the overlay and 
of the target that is to be protected, as well as the details of the operation of 
protocols used to perform the forwarding. However, we assume that: 1) the 
attacker does not have unobstructed access to the network core and 2) the 
attacker cannot severely disrupt large parts of the backbone[3][4].  
II.DoS AND DDoS  OVERVIEW 
A.Denial-of- Service (DoS) Attacks : 
 A DoS attack is a malicious attempt by a single person or a group of people 
to disrupt an online service. DoS attacks can be launched against both 
services, e.g., a web server, and networks, e.g., the network connection to a 
server. The impact of DoS attacks can vary from minor inconvenience to 
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users of a website, to serious financial losses for companies that rely on their 
on-line availability to do business. As emergency and essential services 
become reliant on the Internet as part of their communication infrastructure, 
the consequences of DoS attacks could even become life-threatening. Hence, 
it is crucial to deter, or otherwise minimize, the damage caused by DoS 
attacks. Types of DoS attacks are  TCP SYN Flood Attack,  UDP Flood 
Attacks, Ping of Death Attacks,  Smurf Attacks,  Teardrop Attacks,  Bonk 
Attacks, Land Attacks[6]. 
 
B.Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks : 
When an attacker attacks from multiple source systems, it is called a 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. If the attacker is able to organize 
a large amount of users to connect to the same website at the same time, the 
webserver, often configured to allow a maximum number of client 
connections, will deny further connections. Hence, a denial of service will 
occur.  However, the attacker typically does not own these computers. The 
actual owners are usually not aware of their system being used in a DDoS 
attack. The attacker usually distributes Trojan Horses that contain malicious 
code that allows the attacker to control their system. Such malicious  code is 
also referred to as a Backdoor. Once these Trojan Horses are executed, they 
may use email to inform the attacker that the system can be remotely 
controlled. The attacker will then install the tools required to perform the 
attack. Once the attacker controls enough systems, which are referred to as 
zombies or slaves, he or she can launch the attack[8]. 
 
Fig1. DDoS Attack 
 
III.SECURE SERVICE OVERLAY (SOS) Model 
The goal of the SOS architecture is to allow communication between a 
confirmed user and a target. The model proposes a proactive approach to 
prevent DoS attacks. A target is protected by removing all incoming packets 
from unapproved sources.  A network of selected nodes form an overlay 
which protect a specific target. Packets are validated at entry points of the 
overlay and once inside are tunneled securely to secretly designated nodes.  
Once validated, all traffic is forwarded to the target through the overlay[1].  
 
Fig2. SOS Architecture 
 
A.SOAP - Secure Overlay Access Point : 
o The start point in for all traffic that will communicate with the 
target. 
o Handles authentication of users and traffic. 
 
B.Target : 
o The nodes or set of nodes that will be filtered to only allow 
overlay traffic. 
C.Beacon : 
o The end-point in a chord ring. 
o Beacon forwards traffic to the Secret Servlet. 
D.Secret Servlet : 
o The node that will communicate with a specific target or group of 
targets. 
 
E.To mitigate attacks : 
o No unauthenticated traffic is allowed in the overlay. 
o Filtering of non-overlay traffic near the target can be done at line-
speed. 
o The vulnerability of the target is offloaded onto the overlay. 
o The overlay is recoverable  
F. Design Rationale : 
Fundamentally, the goal of the SOS infrastructure is to distinguish between 
authorized and unauthorized traffic. The former is allowed to reach the 
destination, while the latter is dropped or is rate-limited. Thus, at a very basic 
level, we need the functionality of a firewall within the network so that the 
access link to the  target is not congested. This imaginary firewall would 
perform access control by using protocols such as IPsec.  
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G. Architecture Overview : 
The forwarding of a packet within the SOS architecture, depicted in Figure 
above, proceeds through following stages: 
o A source point that is the origin of the traffic forwards a packet to 
a special overlay node called a SOAP that receives and verifies 
that the source point has a legitimate communication for the 
target. 
o The SOAP routes the packet to a special node in the SOS 
architecture that is easily reached, called the beacon. 
o The beacon forwards the packet to a “secret” node, called the 
secret servlet, whose identity is known to only a small subset of 
participants in the SOS architecture. 
o The secret servlet forwards the packet to the target.The filter 
around the target stops all traffic from reaching the target except 
for traffic that is forwarded from a point whose IP address is the 
secret servlet[3]. 
 
H. Protecting the Target: Filtering : 
In the current Internet, knowledge of the target’s network identifier (IP 
address) allows an attacker to bombard the target location with packets that 
originate from compromised locations throughout the Internet. To prevent 
these attacks, a filter can be constructed that drops illegitimate packets at 
some point in the network. We assume that the filter can be constructed so 
that attackers do not have access to routers inside the filtered region. 
Essentially, we assume that the filter can be constructed locally around the 
target to prevent a bombardment of illegitimate traffic, while at the same time 
allowing legitimate, filtered traffic to successfully reach the target. Such 
filters need to be established at the ISP’s Point of Presence (POP) routers that 
attach to the ISP backbone. 
 
I. Reaching Well-filtered Target : 
Under the filtering mechanism, legitimate users can reach the target by setting 
the filter around the target to permit only those IP addresses that contain 
legitimate users. This straightforward approach has two major shortcomings. 
First, whenever a legitimate user moves, changes IP address, or ceases to be 
legitimate, the filter surrounding the target must be modified. Second, the 
filter does not protect the target from traffic sent by an illegitimate user that 
resides at the same address as a legitimate user, or  from an illegitimate user 
that has knowledge about the location of a legitimate user and spoofs the 
source address of its own transmissions to be that of the legitimate user. A 
first step in our solution is to have the target select a subset of nodes, Ns, that 
participate in the SOS overlay to act as forwarding proxies. The filter only 
allows packets whose source address matches the address of some overlay 
node n 2 Ns. Since n is a willing overlay participant, it is allowed to perform 
more complex verification procedures than simple address filtering and use 
more sophisticated  techniques to verify whether or not a packet sent to it 
originated from a legitimate user of a particular target. The filtering function 
that is applied to a packet or flow can have various levels of complexity. It is, 
however, sufficient to filter on the source address: the router only needs to let 
through packets from one of the few forwarding proxies. All other traffic can 
be dropped, or rate-limited. Because of the small number of such filter rules 
and their simple nature (source IP address filtering), router performance will 
not be impaired, even if we do not utilize specialized hardware. This 
architecture prevents attackers with knowledge of legitimate users’ IP 
addresses from attacking the target. However, an attacker with knowledge of 
the IP address of the proxy can still launch two forms of attacks: an attacker  
can breach the filter and attack the target by spoofing the source address of 
the proxy, or attack the proxy itself. This would prevent legitimate traffic 
from even reaching the proxy, cutting off communication through the overlay 
to the target. Our solution to this form of attack is to hide the identities of the 
proxies. If attackers do not know the identity of a proxy, they cannot mount 
either form of attack mentioned above unless they successfully guess a 
proxy’s identity. We refer to these “hidden” proxies as secret servlets[6]. 
 
J. Reaching a Secret Servlet : 
To activate a secret servlet, the target sends a message to the overlay node that 
it chooses to be a secret servlet, informing that node of its task. Hence, if a 
packet reaches a secret servlet and is subsequently verified as coming from a 
legitimate user, the secret servlet can then forward the packet through the 
filter to the target.  
 
K. Connecting to the Overlay : 
Legitimate users need not reside at nodes that participate in SOS. Hence, SOS 
must support a mechanism that allows legitimate traffic to access the overlay. 
For this purpose, we define a secure overlay access point (SOAP). A SOAP is 
a node that will receive packets that have not yet been verified as legitimate, 
and perform this verification. Effectively, SOS becomes a large distributed 
firewall that discriminates between authorized traffic from unauthorized 
traffic. Having a large number of SOAPs increases the robustness of the 
architecture to attacks, but complicates the job of distributing the security 
information that is used to determine the legitimacy of a transmission toward 
the target.  
 
L. Routing through the Overlay : 
Having each overlay participant select the next node at random is sufficient to 
eventually reach a secret servlet. However, it is rather inefficient, with the 
expected number of intermediate overlay nodes contacted being O(N=Ns) 
where N is the number of nodes in the overlay and Ns is the number of secret 
servlets for a particular target. Here, we discuss an alternative routing strategy 
in which, with only one additional node knowing the identity of the secret 
servlet, the route from a SOAP to the secret servlet has an expected path 
length that is O(logN). We use Chord, which can be viewed as a routing 
service that can be implemented atop the existing IP network fabric, i.e., as a 
network overlay. Consistent hashing is used to map an arbitrary identifier to a 
unique destination node that is an active member of the overlay. 
 
 
 
 
                     International Journal of Engineering Trends and Technology (IJETT) – Volume 8 Number 9- Feb  2014 
 
           ISSN: 2231-5381                    http://www.ijettjournal.org                               Page 482 
 
M. Connecting to the Overlay : 
Legitimate users need not reside at nodes that participate in SOS. Hence, SOS 
must support a mechanism that allows legitimate traffic to access the overlay. 
For this purpose, we define a secure overlay access point (SOAP). A SOAP is 
a node that will receive packets that have not yet been verified as legitimate, 
and perform this verification.[2] Allowing a large number of overlay nodes to 
act as SOAPs increases the bandwidth resources that an attacker must obtain 
to prevent legitimate traffic from accessing the overlay. Effectively, SOS 
becomes a large distributed firewall that discriminates between authorized 
traffic from unauthorized traffic.  
 
IV.SECURITY ANALYSIS 
 
In this section we develop simple analytical models to evaluate the 
performance of SOS considering DoS attacks. We make certain assumptions: 
an attacker knows the set of nodes that form the overlay, and can attack these 
nodes by bombarding them with traffic. However, the attacker does not know 
the precise functionality of the nodes, nor can it infer them. The bandwidth 
available to the attacker to launch attack upon the overlay and the target has 
an upper bound. Furthermore, we assume that the attackers have not breached 
the security protocols of the overlay, i.e., their packets can always be 
identified by SOS as being illegitimate. Finally, each legitimate user can 
access the overlay through a limited number of SOAPs, but different users 
access  the overlay through different SOAPs. 
Following are some security threats to SOS model : 
 
A. Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks : 
DoS attacks are increasingly mounted by professional attackers using huge 
zombie nets consisting of thousands of compromised machines on the 
Internet. Countering DoS attacks on online services has become a very 
challenging problem. The overlay network service provider has to protect the 
applications data hosted by the overlay nodes from DoS and host compromise 
attacks. Protecting the overlay network nodes from DoS and host compromise 
attacks improves service availability.  
 
B. Authenticity Attacks : 
The overlay network service provider has to protect the applications data 
hosted by the overlay nodes from incorrect or fake (spoofed) application data.  
Protecting the overlay network nodes from in- correct or fake application 
data guarantees the authenticity of application data hosted by the nodes.  
 
C. Confidentiality and Integrity Attacks : 
The overlay network service model has to protect the confidentiality and 
integrity from: (a) the overlay network nodes, and (b) unauthorized users. 
 
 
 
 
 
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF SOS MODEL 
 
One particularly attractive feature of the SOS architecture is that it can be 
implemented using existing software and standardized protocols, making its 
adoption and eventual use easier. 
 
A.Filtering:  
All high and medium-range (both in terms of performance and price) routers, 
as well as most desktop and server operating systems, offer some high-speed 
packet classification scheme that can be used to implement the target 
perimeter filtering. A simplified version of can be used by the target to inform 
its perimeter routers of changes in the set of allowed secret servlets. 
 
B.Tunneling:  
Once traffic has entered the overlay network, it needs to be forwarded to other 
SOS nodes toward the beacon, and from there to the secret servlets. Standard 
traffic tunneling techniques,and protocols can be used to this end: IP-in-IP 
encapsulation, GRE encapsulation, or IPsec in “tunnel mode”. Furthermore, 
traffic inside the overlay network can take advantage of traffic prioritization 
schemes such as MPLS or DiffServ, if they are made available by the 
infrastructure providers. The routing decisions inside the overlay network are 
based on a Chord-like mechanism. We envision the overlay nodes to be a mix 
of routers and highspeed end systems. In particular, since IP tunneling is a 
lightweight operation, it is conceivable that SOS functionality can be offered 
by service providers without adversely affecting the performance of their 
networks. The access points to the overlay network can be a mix of routers 
and high-speed end systems. The access points and secret servlets can also act 
as “charging” points, if SOSlike functionality is offered on a commercial 
basis. Finally, since overlay nodes are only called upon to do encapsulated-
packet for  forwarding, cross-provider collaboration6 is a straightforward 
proposition, compared to controlled exposure of the filtering mechanism 
among different providers. 
 
VI.PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF SOS MODEL 
  
Here we describe DoS attacks, and evaluate the SOS architecture using this 
model to mitigate DoS attacks. Our evaluation makes the following 
assumptions: 
o An attacker knows the set of nodes that form the overlay, and can 
attack these nodes by flooding them with traffic[3].  
o An attacker does not know which nodes are secret servlets or 
beacons, and does not infer these identities. 
o Attackers have not breached the security protocols of the overlay, 
i.e., their packets can always be identified by SOS nodes as being 
invalid. 
Each valid user can access the overlay through a limited number of SOAPs, 
but different users access the overlay through different SOAPs[1]. Thus, an 
attacker that wants to prevent all communication to the target will not target 
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the SOAPs of a specific user, since doing so only ensures that only that user 
cannot communicate with the target. 
 
VII.CONCLUSION 
 
Our contributions in this paper are (a) systematically studying the existing 
SOS architecture from the perspective of its basic design features, (b) 
proposing a generalized SOS architecture by introducing flexibility to the 
design features, (c) defining two intelligent DDoS attack models and devel- 
oping an analytical approach towards analyzing the generialized SOS 
architecture under these two attack modelsWe addressed the problem of 
securing a communication service on top of the existing IP infrastructure from 
DoS attacks. In order to decrease the probability of a successful attack, it is 
desirable to have no relationship between the nodes serving special purposes 
in the overlay. We attack the problem with a proactive mechanism, an overlay 
network that can self-heal during (and after) a DoS attack, and a scalable 
access control mechanism that allows legitimate users to use the overlay 
network. We call this architecture Secure Overlay Services, or SOS. The 
resistance of a SOS network against DoS attacks increases greatly with the 
number of nodes that participate in the overlay. We believe that our approach 
is a novel and powerful way of countering DoS attacks, especially in service-
critical environments. The SOS we have developed provide a range of 
defenses that can severely limit the damage caused by DoS and DDoS attacks. 
This is a significant step forward in providing a robust Internet service that 
can be used with confidence for electronic commerce and other on-line 
services. 
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